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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge: 
 
This appeal arises from numerous state and federal class 
actions that the Judicial Panel on Multi-district Litigation 
consolidated for disposition in the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey. This massive, national 
class action involved the claims of over eight million policy 
holders of Prudential Life Insurance Company who were 
represented by many lawyers, including the appellant, 
Michael P. Malakoff and his law firm, Malakoff, Doyle and 
Finberg. The class action eventually reached a settlement. 
However, on the eve of settlement, Lead Counsel for the 
plaintiffs asked the court to sanction Malakoff based upon 
his conduct during the course of the litigation. 
 
After issuing a rule to show cause on the motion for 
sanctions, the District Court referred the matter to a 
magistrate judge who issued a Report and Recommendation 
("R and R") recommending rather severe disciplinary and 
monetary sanctions. The Chief Judge of the District Court 
then assigned Judge Walls to review the R and R. Judge 
Walls approved the R and R with modifications and directed 
the magistrate judge to recalculate the monetary sanctions 
according to the precise costs and expenses resulting from 
the sanctionable conduct. See In re The Prudential 
Insurance Co., 63 F. Supp. 2d 516 (D. N.J. 1999). This 
appeal followed imposition of the modified sanctions. For 





In 1995, Michael P. Malakoff, a Pennsylvania attorney 
experienced in class action litigation, brought two statewide 
class actions against Prudential Insurance Company of 
America in Ohio and West Virginia state courts on behalf of 
Prudential policy holders in those states. Prudential 
removed those class actions to federal district court and 
Malakoff's subsequent motions to remand were denied. The 
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Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation centralized those 
and other class actions that had been brought on behalf of 
Prudential policy holders before Judge Alfred M. Wolin of 
the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey. The centralization order also appointed the law 
firms of Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach of New 
York City and Much, Shelist, Freed, Denenberg, Ament, 
Bell & Rubenstein, P.C. of Chicago as Lead Counsel in the 
national consolidated action. From the outset, Lead 
Counsel and Malakoff disagreed as to whether the actions 
should be litigated in statewide classes or as a national 
class. Malakoff argued that the two state class actions in 
which he was counsel should be litigated separately from 
the national class asserted by Lead Counsel. 
 
The consolidated cases, from which Malakoff had 
successfully excluded his clients, were settled on a 
nationwide basis in late 1996, and Malakoff retained 
objector status in the nationwide action. On December 2, 
1996, Malakoff filed an "emergency" motion to recuse Judge 
Wolin. A few days later, Lead Counsel filed a cross-motion 
for sanctions predicated primarily on Malakoff's recusal 
motion. Judge Wolin referred the sanctions motion to then 
Magistrate Judge Joel A. Pisano. Following Malakoff's 
voluminous objections to the proposed settlement, Lead 
Counsel supplemented their cross-motion for sanctions 
with citations to numerous other instances of Malakoff's 
alleged sanctionable conduct. 
 
As proponent of the statewide claims for Ohio and West 
Virginia, Malakoff raised many objections to the proposed 
national class settlement, and to Lead Counsel's request for 
$90 million in attorneys' fees. In March, 1997, Malakoff 
filed his own motion to sanction Lead Counsel under 28 
U.S.C. S 1927. Shortly thereafter, Malakoff filed an 
additional motion for sanctions, this time relying upon Fed. 
R. Civ. Proc. 11, but alleging the same conduct that formed 
the basis of his S 1927 motion. See A-2818, 3485. On 
March 17, 1997, Judge Wolin, in an exhaustive and 
carefully drafted opinion, approved the settlement. In re 
Prudential Sales Practice Litig., 962 F. Supp. 450 (D. N. J. 
1997). Shortly thereafter, the District Court issued an order 
and opinion awarding attorneys' fees to Lead Counsel. 962 
F. Supp. 572 (D. N. J. 1997). 
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We affirmed Judge Wolin's approval of the settlement on 
appeal, but vacated the attorneys' fee award and remanded 
for further consideration. See In Re Prudential Sales 
Practice Litig., 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998). On remand, 
Lead Counsel moved for an interim fee award which 
Malakoff opposed. Lead Counsel also moved for sanctions 
against Malakoff based upon statements Malakoff made in 
his opposition documents. However, that request for 
sanctions was withdrawn within the "safe harbor" period.1 
See A-3192, 3485. Nonetheless, a week later Malakoff filed 
yet another motion against Lead Counsel under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1927. That motion was based on the sanctions that Lead 
Counsel had requested under Rule 11 even though that 
motion had been withdrawn. See A-3485(23). 
 
Following the United States Supreme Court's denial of a 
petition for certiorari from our decision affirming the 
settlement,2 Judge Wolin referred all motions for sanctions 
to Magistrate Judge Pisano. Judge Pisano issued an R and 
R recommending that sanctions be imposed against 
Malakoff. The sanctions included a compensatory payment 
of $100,000 to Lead Counsel under 28 U.S.C. S 1927, and 
a non-monetary requirement that Malakoff attach a copy of 
that R and R as well as a certification that he had paid the 
attorneys fees ordered therein, to all future motions for pro 
hac vice admission in the United States District Court for 
the District of New Jersey. See A-3485A(35). 
 
Malakoff objected to the R and R. Judge Wolin recused 
himself, and the Chief Judge of the District Court assigned 
Malakoff's objections to Judge William H. Walls of the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. 
Judge Walls substantially adopted Judge Pisano's report 
and rejected Malakoff's objection; however, Judge Walls 
remanded the recommendation for compensatory payment 
to Lead Counsel of $100,000 to Judge Pisano. The remand 
was for a determination of the precise amount of excess 
fees and expenses lead counsel incurred as a result of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. For a discussion of the 21 day "safe harbor" provision contained in 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 see Zuk v. Eastern Pennsylvania Psychiatric Institute, 
103 F.3d 294 (3rd Cir. 1996). 
 
2. 525 U.S. 1114 (1999). 
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Malakoff's sanctionable conduct. Judge Walls also reduced 
the time that Malakoff would have to attach the R and R 
and the aforementioned certification of compliance to 
subsequent motions for pro hac vice admission to five years 
from the date of the first motion for pro hac vice admission. 
On remand, Malakoff and Lead Counsel agreed that the 
compensatory sanction award be reduced to $50,000 if we 
uphold the sanctions on appeal. That modification was 
approved, and Malakoff filed this appeal. 
 
We are only concerned with the propriety of the sanctions 
imposed by the District Court against Malakoff following 
the protracted and hard-fought consolidated class action 
proceedings. Malakoff contends that his conduct did not 
warrant monetary or disciplinary sanctions, and that 
sanctions were imposed without adequate notice or 
"opportunity to be heard."3 Issues pertaining to the 
adequacy of Malakoff's "opportunity to be heard," are 
questions of law subject to plenary review. In Re Tutu Wells 
Contamination Litig., 120 F.3d 368, 383 (3d Cir. 1997). 
However, we review whether the facts warrant the 
imposition of monetary and disciplinary sanctions for an 
abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we will only reverse the 
District Court if the sanctions resulted from an 
unsupported finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law, or 
an improper application of law to fact. See In re: Orthopedic 
Bone Screw Prods. Litig., 193 F.3d 781,795 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
The District Court imposed sanctions pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1927, as well as its inherent power to control the 
course of litigation. Although we will discuss the legal 
principles underlying these sanctions in more detail below, 
it will be helpful to preliminarily set forth the underlying 
legal principles for imposing sanctions. We will then 
examine Malakoff's conduct to determine if the sanctions 
were appropriate here. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Malakoff argues that he was denied the opportunity to be heard in 
opposition to the sanctions motion because of the District Court's denial 
of his discovery requests regarding submissions made after he filed his 
recusal motion. We have previously held that Malakoff was not entitled 
to more discovery. See Prudential Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d at 343- 
45. 
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In Hackman v. Valley Fair, 932 F.2d 239 (3rd Cir. 1991) 
we noted that: 
 
       a finding of willful bad faith on the part of the 
       offending lawyer is a prerequisite . . . [for imposing 
       sanctions under 28 U.S.C. S 1927]. Bad faith is a 
       factual determination reviewable under the clearly 
       erroneous standard. Once a finding of bad faith is 
       made, the appropriateness of sanctions is a matter 
       entrusted to the discretion of the district court. 
 
932 F.2d at 242. 
 
Similarly, an award of fees and costs pursuant to the 
court's inherent authority to control litigation will usually 
require a finding of bad faith.4 In Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 
501 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1991) the Supreme Court stated that 
a court has the inherent authority to impose sanctions 
when an attorney has acted "in bad faith, vexatiously, 
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." We also review an 
award of sanctions pursuant to the court's inherent powers 
for an abuse of discretion. "[S]uch an abuse occurs when 
the court's decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding 
of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper 
application of law to fact." In Re: Orthopedic Bone Screw 
Products Liability Litig., 193 F.3d 781, 795 (3rd Cir. 1999) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
II. Malakoff's Conduct. 
 
Judge Walls rested the S 1927 sanctions upon the 
following conduct: (1) Malakoff's motion to recuse Judge 
Wolin; (2) Malakoff's criticism of the fee examiner; (3) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We state that a finding of bad faith is "usually" required under the 
court's inherent powers because we noted in Republic of Philippines v. 
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 74 n.11 that such sanctions do 
not always require a showing of bad faith. Thus, in Martin v. Brown, we 
were careful to note that "[u]sually the inherent power that a district 
court retains to sanction attorneys also requires a finding of bad faith." 
63 F.3d 1252 at 1265 (emphasis added). We need not dwell on when, if 
at all, a court may impose such sanctions without first finding bad faith 
because, as we discuss below, the district court here implicitly made 
such a finding, and that finding was not clearly erroneous. 
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Malakoff's releasing recusal motion papers to the press; (4) 
affidavits Malakoff filed in March of 1997; (5) Malakoff's 
demand for a "keyword" search of discovery documents 
provided by Prudential as well as a demand that Class 
Counsel provide him with charts summarizing evidence to 
be used at the fairness hearing; and (6) sanctions motions 
Malakoff filed under Rule 11 and S 1927. We will examine 
each of these in turn. 
 
(1). The Motion to Recuse. 
 
Malakoff filed a motion to recuse as an emergency motion 
on December 2, 1996. He alleged that Judge Wolin had 
improper ex parte communications with various people 
involved in the nationwide litigation, that Judge Wolin 
obstructed reasonable access to documents related to the 
fairness of the settlement and that Judge Wolin had shown 
partiality towards Prudential and towards the fairness of 
the settlement. App. at 833-859. 
 
Malakoff rested the motion primarily upon the charge 
that Judge Wolin had improper ex parte meetings with 
Prudential's President and counsel on August 12, 1996 at 
a settlement conference, and an October 16, 1996, on the 
record conference with certain state insurance regulators. 
Finally, Malakoff alleged that Judge Wolin had improperly 
attempted to influence a state court trial judge in a 
Pennsylvania state court case. 
 
Prudential and Class Counsel opposed the recusal 
motion. Judge Wolin set an expedited schedule for 
responses and scheduled a hearing on the motion for 
December 13, 1996. However, when Prudential and Class 
Counsel voiced their opposition, Malakoff demanded a delay 
of twenty days to reply. The District Court denied that 
request and held the hearing as scheduled. Judge Wolin 
denied the recusal motion after that hearing and argument 
on the motion. Malakoff then petitioned for a writ of 
mandamus which we denied. His mandamus papers 
reiterated the same arguments that we had rejected on 
appeal from the approval of the class settlement and 
fairness hearing. See 148 F.3d at 342-34. 
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In sanctioning Malakoff under S 1927, Judge Walls 
rejected Malakoff's contention that the recusal motion had 
a colorable basis in fact and was not filed in bad faith. 
Rather, Judge Walls concluded that "Malakoff intentionally 
filed an unreasonable recusal motion." 63 F. Supp. 2d at 
520. In his appeal to us, Malakoff has dropped most of the 
charges he had previously based his recusal motion on, 
including his charge that Judge Wolin had improper ex 
parte settlement communications with Prudential's 
President and counsel.5 Instead, he asserts that the 
following three bases for recusal demonstrate that his 
motion for recusal had a colorable basis and was not filed 
in bad faith. 
 
First, Malakoff alleges that Judge Wolin attempted to 
intervene on Prudential's behalf in a Pennsylvania state 
court case called Rutt v. Prudential. According to Malakoff, 
in a hearing in that case before the state court trial judge, 
Prudential's counsel, Hirshman, argued for the 
disqualification of a lawyer named Miller who represented 
the Rutts. According to Malakoff, Hirshman told the state 
trial judge that Judge Wolin had information for the court 
regarding Miller and that Judge Wolin "is receptive to a 
discussion with Your Honor by telephone about his views." 
Malakoff's Br. at 13. Malakoff alleges that Hirsham told the 
state judge that Judge Wolin had "information to share" 
and suggested that the state judge call Judge Wolin. Id. at 
13-14. The state court trial judge purportedly declined 
Hirshman's invitation, saying that it would be "highly 
improper" for him to contact Judge Wolin. Id . at 14. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The District Court correctly noted, "the Manual for Complex Litigation 
acknowledges that federal judges may meet separately with parties for 
confidential settlement conferences. Finally, the Code of Judicial 
Conduct for United States Judges permits separate conversations with 
parties with the consent of counsel who are authorized to object. This 
Court concludes that any reasonable attorney would have understood 
that Judge Wolin could permissibly engage in ex parte communication in 
a complex class action such as In re Prudential." 63 F. Supp.2d at 520. 
 
The district court found that Malakoff waived entitlement to notice of, 
and opportunity to object to, such meetings because he had consented 
to ex parte communications relating to settlement long before he filed the 
recusal motion. Id. 
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According to Malakoff, the whole purpose of this contact 
with the state judge was delaying the trial of the Rutt case 
until after the nationwide settlement was approved. 
 
At the recusal hearing, Judge Wolin stated that he would 
have spoken to the state judge "as a matter of courtesy," 
however, he categorically denied knowing the state judge 
ever attempting to contact him, or even caring about the 
outcome of the Rutt case. App. at 891-92. Nothing on this 
record contradicts Judge Wolin's assertion. To the contrary, 
Malakoff's own brief now belies his charge that Judge 
Wolin attempted to intervene, and affirms that what 
actually happened was "that Prudential attorneys urged 
[the state trial judge] to contact Judge Wolin." Malakoff's 
Br. at 38. Therefore, Malakoff's charge was not based on 
anything Judge Wolin said or did. Rather, it was based 
upon something Prudential's counsel tried to get the state 
trial court judge to do. When Malakoff leveled this 
allegation of bias in his merits appeal we stated:"[t]here is 
no basis for believing the District Court was attempting to 
influence the state court proceedings in Rutt  . . . [and 
Malakoff's claims to the contrary] are clearly without 
merit." 148 F.3d at 345. 
 
Malakoff also alleged that Judge Wolin ought to be 
recused because the judge had an improper ex parte 
communication with David Gross. Gross' client was a 
former Prudential employee named David Fastenberg, and 
Fastenberg had been accused of destroying documents 
relevant to the Prudential litigation. Malakoff based this 
allegation of Judge Wolin's impropriety upon a statement 
Judge Wolin made at an October 16, 1996 hearing. During 
the course of that hearing, Judge Wolin stated that 
"Fastenberg's own lawyers say there was no document 
destruction." Malakoff's Br. at 15. Malakoff alleged that 
this purportedly improper communication on a matter 
concerning destruction of material and disputed 
documents, demonstrates Judge Wolin's favoring of 
Prudential. 
 
However, Prudential had fired Fastenberg for allegedly 
allowing the destruction of documents in offices he 
supervised, and Fastenberg responded by suing Prudential 
for wrongful determination. The alleged document 
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destruction was a matter of public record. Moreover, 
Fastenberg's termination and his suit against Prudential 
had been widely reported in the press. Judge Wolin 
explained to Malakoff at the recusal hearing that he learned 
of Fastenberg's denial in the press and through a letter 
written to him by Lead Counsel for Prudential in a related 
case. Nothing on this record contradicts that. There was no 
improper communication by Judge Wolin with Fastenberg's 
lawyer. In fact, there was no communication at all. 
 
Furthermore, Malakoff should have readily dismissed any 
suggestion that Judge Wolin favored Prudential when Judge 
Wolin directed Class Counsel to conduct an accelerated 
investigation of document destruction allegations. On 
January 6, 1997 Judge Wolin fined Prudential $1,000,000 
for destroying documents. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of 
America Sales Practices Litig., 169 F. R. D. 598 (D. N. J. 
1997). Yet, Malakoff persists in this accusation to this very 
day. 
 
Malakoff's third reason for insisting that his recusal 
motion had a colorable basis and was not filed in bad faith 
is his charge that Judge Wolin had an October 16, 1996 on 
the record conference with state insurance regulators 
during which Judge Wolin indicated that he favored a 
national settlement of the policyholders' claims against 
Prudential. In Malakoff's view, the court's indication that it 
favored a settlement showed that it was partial to 
Prudential and could not, therefore, be an impartial, 
objective reviewer of the settlement. Malakoff rests this 
claim upon the following statement of Judge Wolin at the 
October 16 hearing: 
 
       I'd like to be on the same page with you, realizing that 
       we all have the same constituency. When I say 
       `constituency,' I'm talking about the claimants, the 
       10.7 million people who are policyholders of Prudential 
       . . . . Because I think that our goals have to be the 
       same: we want to eliminate confusion, we want to 
       make sure that claimants are . . . remediated properly. 
 
Malakoff's Br. at 41. Judge Wolin also referred to the 
proposed settlement as "my settlement" and said "although 
I wasn't in all of the negotiations, I wasn't just a pretty 
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face." Id. at 42. However, nothing suggests that these 
remarks have the significance that Malakoff attempts to 
attach to them. Moreover, Malakoff does not bother to 
mention that Judge Wolin was careful to add the following 
caveat at the end of the October conference: 
 
       No one should leave here today thinking that Judge 
       Wolin's silence, Judge Wolin's nod, a smile at a 
       particular time, means that he will approve this 
       settlement. I don't have the slightest idea. I don't know 
       who the objectors are, I haven't heard any evidence. 
 
App. at 603. Moreover, we have already rejected the"spin" 
Malakoff's recusal motion sought to put on those 
statements. Malakoff made the same argument regarding 
these remarks on appeal from the fairness hearing. We 
stated that the "allegation [of impropriety] has no merit." 
148 F.3d at 344. 
 
(2). Criticism of the Fee Examiner. 
 
On November 6, 1996, the District Court appointed 
Stephen M. Greenberg, Esq., as a Fee Examiner to"review 
the application for attorneys' fees and expenses" for Class 
Counsel. App. at 677. According to Prudential, that 
appointment was made after consultation with Class 
Counsel and Prudential and after those counsel had met 
with Greenberg. Malakoff received a copy of the Order 
appointing Greenberg and on November 15, 1996, Malakoff 
wrote a letter to Greenberg introducing himself. 
Significantly, Malakoff did not object to the fact or the 
manner of Greenberg's appointment in that letter. 
 
However, two months later, Malakoff filed an emergency 
motion seeking to have Greenberg's appointment vacated. 
Malakoff alleged that Greenberg's appointment had been ex 
parte and in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(d)(1), because 
the first meeting of the parties and their attorneys was not 
held within 20 days of the order appointing the examiner.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(d)(1) requires the fee examiner to conduct a "first 
meeting of the parties or their attorneys to be held within 20 days after 
the order [appointing the examiner] and notify the parties or their 
attorneys." Malakoff says that when he requested that the district court 
enforce Rule 53 and direct the fee examiner to hold the meeting, the 
district court replied, "It's not a perfect world, is it Mr. Malakoff?" 
 
                                12 
 
 
Judge Wolin denied Malakoff's motion to vacate 
Greenberg's appointment. The judge found that Malakoff 
had waived his right to object by (1) not objecting at the 
time Greenberg was appointed; (2) writing to Greenberg 
nine days after Greenberg was appointed proposing that 
they collaborate in efforts to obtain materials related to the 
application for attorneys' fees; (3) waiting two months 
before seeking to vacate Greenberg's appointment, and (4) 
failing to provide any reason for waiting those two months. 
App. at 2501(4). Judge Wolin also found that Malakoff's 
Rule 53 objections were "hyper-technical" since "Greenberg 
met with the parties five days prior to the date of the 
November order and 27 days after the date of the November 
order." Id. at 2501(1)-2504(14)(a)). 
 
In his "sanctions opinion," Judge Walls concluded that 
Malakoff had no basis for trying to vacate Greenberg's 
appointment because Malakoff had initially approved 
Greenberg's appointment. 63 F. Supp.2d at 521. Moreover, 
Judge Walls agreed that Malakoff's Rule 53 argument was 
"hyper-technical." Id.  
 
(3). Release of Motion to Recuse to the Press. 
 
Judge Walls accepted Magistrate Judge Pisano's 
consideration of Malakoff's failure to provide Judge Wolin 
with courtesy copies of motion papers in imposing 
sanctions. Judge Walls noted that: 
 
       Magistrate Judge Pisano indicates that Mr. Malakoff 
       repeatedly failed to send courtesy copies of motion 
       papers to Judge Wolin's chambers. This deficiency was 
       specifically addressed by Judge Wolin in Mr. 
       Malakoff's December 13, 1996 motion to recuse. 
 
In re: The Prudential Insurance Co., 63 F. Supp. 2d at 522. 
 
Malakoff submits that Judge Walls found that his failure 
to provide courtesy copies of his various motions to Judge 
Wolin was sanctionable conduct. He contends he did not 
provide courtesy copies because, until that time, he had 
always filed his motions in accordance with local rules and 
Judge Wolin never had objected to that practice. Under 
local rules, the clerk of court forwards filings to the 
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assigned judge. According to Malakoff, it was only at the 
end of the recusal hearing that Judge Wolin chastised him 
for not providing the courtesy copies of filings. Malakoff 
asserts that Judge Walls was therefore wrong in finding 
that his failure to provide courtesy copies was sanctionable. 
 
However, Judge Walls did not consider Malakoff's general 
failure to provide courtesy copies to Judge Wolin in 
imposing sanctions. Rather, Judge Walls considered 
Malakoff's release of his recusal motion to the press 
without first providing a copy to Judge Wolin. 
 
At the recusal hearing, Judge Wolin expressly found that 
"copies of the Malakoff motion were submitted or leaked to 
the press in advance of their receipt by the Court. At least 
three major newspapers sought comment from this Court 
as to applications, the existence of which the Court was 
unaware." App. at 1492. Malakoff claims that several days 
after he filed the motion to recuse, he was contacted by the 
press and provided copies to them. Thus, because he 
complied with the rules of court and because the press 
initiated the contact, he insists that this conduct was not 
sanctionable. But, Judge Walls found otherwise. He 
concluded: "as an experienced attorney, [Malakoff] should 
have realized that the clerk's office would not deliver 
courtesy copies to chambers immediately. [Malakoff's] 
failure to accord Judge Wolin the same respect as the 
media was `unacceptable' and indicates that he acted in 
bad faith." 63 F. Supp.2d at 522. 
 
(4). The March 1997 Affidavits. 
 
In December of 1996, Judge Wolin held a hearing to 
address accusations that Prudential had destroyed 
documents related to the class action. Malakoff was not in 
court that day, but he maintains that his associate, David 
Snyder, was. Nonetheless, on January 13, 1997, Malakoff 
filed his "Tenth Affidavit," alleging that an improper ex 
parte communication occurred on December 30, 1996 
between Judge Wolin, Karen Suter, Deputy Attorney 
General for the New Jersey Department of Banking, and 
Anita Kartalopolous, Deputy Commissioner for that 
Department. Subsequent to the filing of Malakoff's "Tenth 
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Affidavit," Suter and Kartalopolous filed affidavits denying 
any improper ex parte discussion with Judge Wolin. In fact, 
in those affidavits, both women said they asked the 
courtroom clerk if there was an attorney conference room 
where they could make a phone call to the Banking 
Commissioner. According to those sworn affidavits, a 
courtroom deputy told them none was available. However, 
Judge Wolin overheard that conversation and offered the 
use of one of the phones in his library conference room. 
That was the extent of their conversation with Judge Wolin. 
 
However, despite the affidavits from Suter and 
Kartalopolous, Malakoff filed a "Corrected Tenth Affidavit," 
on February 17, 1997, which was identical to the"Tenth 
Affidavit" except that it changed, without explanation, the 
date of the alleged ex parte communication from December 
30th to December 16. Then, on March 14, 1997, Malakoff 
filed his "Twenty Third Affidavit," in which he once again 
alleged that an improper ex parte discussion occurred on 
December 16, between Judge Wolin, Suter and 
Kartalopolous. Three days later, Malakoff filed his"Twenty 
Fourth Affidavit," in which he repeatedly accused Judge 
Wolin of catering to the interests of Prudential and Class 
Counsel. 
 
Judge Walls found that the 23rd and 24th affidavits 
merely restated already rejected arguments, attempted to 
explain Malakoff's reasons for filing motions that had 
already been denied, and repeated allegations of Judge 
Wolin's impropriety that Malakoff had made in his recusal 
motion. Judge Walls also found that the 24th affidavit was 
not filed in connection with any new or pending motion. 
Consequently, Judge Walls concluded that Malakoff filed 
the 23rd and 24th affidavits for the sole purpose of 
embarrassing Judge Wolin. 63 F. Supp.2d at 522. 
 
(5). Discovery Matters. 
 
Judge Walls considered two instances of Malakoff's 
conduct over discovery materials in sanctioning Malakoff. 
 
The first involved Malakoff's demand for a "keyword" 
search of documents produced during discovery. On 
October 28, 1996, Class Counsel and Prudential received 
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Judge Wolin's order conditionally approving the settlement 
of the consolidated class action. Judge Wolin made 
available to all policyholders who signed a Stipulation of 
Confidentiality "deposition transcripts and attached 
exhibits as well as . . . all other documents generated in 
this lawsuit." 
 
According to Class Counsel, over 1,000,000 pages of 
documents, 160 computer diskettes, 500 audio and video 
tapes, hundreds of interviews with current and former 
Prudential employees, twenty depositions, plus all of the 
documents that Prudential had produced to the Multi-State 
Task Force was then available. Numerous lawyers for 
policyholders apparently reviewed the documents in three 
document depositories around the country that Class 
Counsel had established for that purpose. According to 
Class Counsel, Malakoff indicated in early November 1996 
that he intended to review the documents and Class 
Counsel sent him copies of their own indices to the 
documents to assist with that review. However, Malakoff 
did not review the materials. Rather, he demanded 
additional discovery despite not having reviewed the 
discovery material already available. On December 30, 
1996, after Malakoff complained about not being able to 
review the documents, Judge Wolin suggested that he go to 
Class Counsel's offices in New York for document review. 
Malakoff maintains that he asked Judge Wolin to direct 
Class Counsel to allow him (Malakoff) to use the class 
keyword search facility because only a few of the many 
documents were relevant to Malakoff's objections. Judge 
Wolin denied that request as unfair, and Malakoff sent an 
associate to Class Counsel's office. However, the associate 
only demanded that Class Counsel conduct keyword 
searches for him. He did not review any discovery material. 
 
The second set of circumstances involving discovery that 
Judge Walls considered concerned Malakoff's demand for 
"charts" summarizing evidence. On January 28, 1997, 
Judge Wolin entered an order permitting Class Counsel to 
use demonstrative evidence at the fairness hearing, and 
requiring Class Counsel to provide an adequate opportunity 
for any interested party to inspect the demonstrative 
evidence at Class Counsel's New York office. Judge Wolin's 
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order specified, however, that the "opportunity for such 
inspection does not create any obligation [on Class 
Counsel] to provide any copies of such demonstrative 
evidence to any person inspecting the same." 
 
Malakoff asserts that it was not feasible for him to review 
this demonstrative evidence in New York, and he therefore 
requested that Prudential and Class Counsel fax copies of 
the charts to him. According to Malakoff, Prudential 
complied with his request, but Class Counsel refused and 
demanded that he go to New York to review the charts. 
Rather than doing that, Malakoff filed yet another 
"emergency" motion on February 19, 1997. Judge Wolin 
denied that motion finding, among other things, that 
Malakoff had not shown why compliance with the previous 
order allowing inspection was not feasible. Judge Wolin was 
also concerned that Malakoff waited until the eleventh hour 
to raise the issue (the fairness hearing was set for February 
24, 1997). 
 
Judge Walls considered these actions and wrote: 
 
       Mr. Malakoff's actions demonstrate a failure on his 
       part to abide with the discovery process agreed to by 
       counsel and the Court in this action. That no other 
       attorney objected to the process or sought specific 
       concessions from the court or opposing counsel 
       demonstrates that the procedure was unobjectionable. 
       Mr. Malakoff's resistance to the discovery process and 
       his attempts to exempt himself therefrom unreasonably 
       multiplied the straightforward discovery process and 
       delayed the ultimate settlement of the case. 
 
63 F. Supp.2d at 522. 
 
(6). Filing Rule 11 and S 1927 Sanctions Motions. 
 
As noted, when Malakoff filed his recusal motion, Class 
Counsel cross-moved for sanctions against Malakoff under 
S 1927, and then, on the same day as the fairness hearing, 
supplemented their cross-motion for sanctions. In 
response, Malakoff filed his own motion for sanctions 
against Class Counsel under S 1927, and shortly thereafter, 
he served a motion for sanctions against Class Counsel 
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under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 based upon Class Counsel's 
sanctions motion. 
 
Malakoff's S 1927 motion consisted entirely of his 
defenses to Class Counsel's sanctions motion. In his R and 
R, Magistrate Judge Pisano concluded that Malakoff's 
S 1927 motion "fails mightily to show why the court should 
sanction Class Counsel." R&R at 31. Magistrate Judge 
Pisano also concluded that Malakoff's Rule 11 motion was 
absolutely identical to his S 1927 sanctions motion. Judge 
Walls held that both motions were only defenses to Class 
Counsel's S 1927 motion and did "not advance a coherent 
legal argument as to why [Class Counsel] should be 
sanctioned." 63 F. Supp.2d at 523. Inasmuch as Malakoff 
conceded that the legal standards for S 1927 and Rule 11 
are different, Judge Walls concluded that these duplicitous 
motions demonstrated that Malakoff had abused the 
sanctions process.7 Id. Judge Walls concluded that 
Malakoff's "identical motions were baseless and filed in bad 
faith." Id. 
 
III. Sanctions Under 18 U.S.C. S 1927.  
 
As noted above, the monetary sanctions here were 
imposed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1927. Section 1927 
provides: 
 
       Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct 
       cases in any court of the United States or any Territory 
       thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case 
       unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the 
       court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, 
       and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of 
       such conduct. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 1927. "Although a trial court has broad 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. For example, S 1927 sanctions are applicable only to an attorney and 
requires a finding of bad faith. Williams v. Giant Eagle Markets, Inc., 
883 
F.2d 1184, 1191 (3d Cir. 1989). Rule 11 authorizes sanctions against a 
signer of a pleading, etc. presented for an improper purpose and requires 
only a showing of objectively unreasonable conduct. Fellheimer, Eichen & 
Braverman v. Charter Technologies, Inc., 57 F.3d 1215, 1225 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
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discretion in managing litigation before it, the principal 
purpose of imposing sanctions under 28 U.S.C. S 1927 is 
the deterrence of intentional and unnecessary delay in the 
proceedings." Zuk v. Eastern Pennsylvania Psychiatric 
Institute, 103 F.3d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation and 
internal quotations omitted). 
 
As is evident from the text of the statute, S 1927 requires 
a court to find an attorney has (1) multiplied proceedings; 
(2) in an unreasonable and vexatious manner; (3) thereby 
increasing the cost of the proceedings; and (4) doing so in 
bad faith or by intentional misconduct. Williams v Giant 
Eagle Markets, Inc. 883 F.2d 1184, 1191 (3rd Cir. 1989). 
"[B]efore a court can order the imposition of attorneys' fees 
under S 1927, it must find willful bad faith on the part of 
the offending attorney." Zuk, 103 F.3d at 297. "Indications 
of this bad faith are findings that the claims advanced were 
meritless, that counsel knew or should have known this, 
and that the motive for filing the suit was for an improper 
purpose such as harassment." Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of 
Teachers Local 231, Am. Fed. of Teachers, AFL-CIO , 829 
F.2d 1370, 1375 (6th Cir. 1987). Inasmuch as S 1927 
addresses the impact conduct has on the proceedings, 
sanctions that are imposed under S 1927 must only impose 
costs and expenses that result from the particular 
misconduct. Martin v. Brown, 63 F.3d 1252, 1264 (3d Cir. 
1995). Moreover, these costs and expenses are limited to 
those that could be taxed under 28 U.S.C. S 1920. Id.  
 
IV. Sanctions Pursuant to the Court's Inherent Power. 
 
In addition to the monetary sanctions imposed under 
S 1927, the District Court also imposed disciplinary 
sanctions. These sanctions required Malakoff to certify that 
he had paid the monetary fine, and attach a copy of the R 
and R to all applications for admission pro hac vice for five 
years from the date of the first such application. This 
sanction was imposed under the court's inherent power. 
Moreover, the sanctioning order also provided that, if 
Malakoff were to be sanctioned again within the five year 
period, the five year limitation would disappear and he 
would thereafter be required to submit the proof of 
payment, together with a copy of the R and R, with every 
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application for pro hac vice admission to the District Court 
for as long as he practiced law. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of 
Am. Sales Prac. Litig., 63 F. Supp. 516, 525 (D. N.J. 1999). 
 
"It has long been understood that certain implied powers 
must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the 
nature of their institution, powers which cannot be 
dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to 
the exercise of all others." Fellheimer, Eichen & Braverman, 
P. C., v. Charter Technologies, Inc., 57 F.3d 1215, 1224 
(quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 
(1991)(internal brackets and citations omitted))."Among the 
implied and incidental powers of a federal court is the 
power to discipline attorneys who appear before it." Id. 
(quoting Chambers, at 43). 
 
Circumstances that may justify sanctions pursuant to a 
court's inherent power include 
 
       cases where a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, 
       wantonly, or for oppressive reasons. . . . The imposition 
       of sanctions in this instance transcends a court's 
       equitable power concerning relations between the 
       parties and reaches a court's inherent power to police 
       itself, thus serving the dual purpose of vindicating 
       judicial authority without resort to the more drastic 
       sanctions available for contempt of court and making 
       the prevailing party whole for expenses caused by his 
       opponent's obstinacy. Id.  
 
(quoting Chambers, at 45-46). 
 
A court may resort to its inherent power to impose 
sanctions even if much of the misconduct at issue is also 
sanctionable under statute or rules of court. Chambers, at 
45. However, "[b]ecause of their very potency, inherent 
powers must be exercised with restraint and caution." 
Chambers, at 44; see also Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 
757 F.2d 557, 562 (3d Cir. 1985)(en banc). Although a 
court retains the inherent right to sanction when rules of 
court or statutes also provide a vehicle for sanctioning 
misconduct, resort to these inherent powers is not 
preferred when other remedies are available. Moreover, the 
analysis in Chambers "leads to the conclusion that if 
statutory or rules-based sanctions are entirely adequate, 
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they should be invoked, rather than the inherent power." 
Gregory P. Joseph, Sanctions: The Federal Law of Litigation 
Abuse, 428 (3rd ed. 1999) (hereinafter Sanctions Treatise). 
Therefore, "[g]enerally, a court's inherent power should be 
reserved for those cases in which the conduct of a party or 
an attorney is egregious and no other basis for sanctions 
exists." Martin v. Brown, 63 F.3d at 1265. 
 
V. The Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Imposing 
       Sanctions Under S 1927 
 
As we stated at the outset, sanctions under S 1927 or the 
court's inherent power may not be made in the absence of 
a finding of bad faith. However, that finding need not be 
explicit. An implicit finding of bad faith will support 
sanctions just as well so long as it is not an abuse of 
discretion, not based upon clearly erroneous factual 
findings, and not based upon an error of law. Baker 
Industries at 209. 
 
Here, Judge Walls did not make an express finding of bad 
faith. Nor did Judge Walls rely upon any of the above- 
specified conduct in particular. Rather, he based his finding 
of the requisite bad faith and vexatious conduct on the 
totality of the campaign Malakoff waged during the course 
of this litigation, not upon any single maneuver. The 
District Court assessed that conduct in its totality in 
imposing sanctions and affirming the findings of the 
Magistrate Judge. In his R and R, the Magistrate Judge 
explained: 
 
        [w]hen viewed individually, each single instance of 
       misbehavior by Mr. Malakoff might not warrant the 
       sanctions arrived at by the court. But considered as a 
       whole, his transgressions evidence a pattern of 
       obfuscation and mean spiritedness. Thankfully, it is 
       not often that the Court encounters such behavior, and 
       the undersigned is completely satisfied that, under 
       disciplinary rubric, Mr. Malakoff's conduct warrants 
       stern sanctions. 
 
R&R at 25 (emphasis added). Moreover, the District Court 
specifically cited this finding in affirming the sanctions. See 
In Re Prudential 63 F. Supp. 2d at 521 ("The Magistrate 
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Judge concluded that Mr. Malakoff `abused the privileges of 
practicing before this Court. His behavior since his arrival 
on the scene in this litigation has been deplorable. 
Examples of this conduct are numerous and . . .[not] a 
one-time lapse in judgment.' The Court thus found that 
`considered as a whole, his transgressions evidence a 
pattern of obfuscation and mean spiritedness.' "). 
 
Judge Walls noted that Malakoff "began bombard[ing] the 
Court with paper soon after the transfers." In Re Prudential 
Insurance Co., 63 F. Supp 2d at 518. This record readily 
discloses implicit findings of bad faith, and those findings 
were not clearly erroneous. 
 
       The district court's finding of willfulness on 
       [Malakoff's] part, as a finding of fact, is subject to 
       reversal only if clearly erroneous. This standard 
       requires us to pay deference to the district court's 
       interpretation of the factual record before it. Once such 
       a finding is made, the appropriateness of assessing 
       attorneys' fees against counsel under section 1927 is a 
       matter for the district court's discretion. 
 
Baker Industries, 764 F.2d at 209-10 (citations omitted). 
Accordingly, we do not second-guess the District Court that 
was managing the front lines of this massive class action 
unless its findings were clearly erroneous or its exercise of 
decision arbitrary or unjustified. 
 
The course of conduct here allows for only one 
conclusion, and it is the one reached by the Magistrate 
Judge and District Court. We can not conclude that the 
District Court's finding that Malakoff litigated in a 
vexatious manner and in bad faith was clearly erroneous. 
He multiplied the proceedings at nearly every turn, and 
increased the cost of this litigation accordingly. His 
baseless recusal motion required responses by Class 
Counsel and a hearing by Judge Wolin. His emergency 
motion to vacate the fee examiner's appointment, an 
appointment that he originally approved, also necessitated 
responses by Class Counsel and required Judge Wolin to 
write a thirteen page opinion in support of his order 
denying the motion. His demand for a key word search 
(after he failed to make any efforts to review the documents 
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available at Class Counsel's New York Office) meant that 
Judge Wolin had to address that demand at a case 
management conference held to discuss the proposed 
settlement hearing. Malakoff's emergency motion 
demanding that Class Counsel fax charts summarizing the 
evidence to be used at the fairness hearing once again 
necessitated responses by Class Counsel and once again 
meant that Judge Wolin had to write an opinion and order 
denying that motion. His filing of two identical  sanctions 
motions, despite the fact that they were filed under different 
provisions having different standards of proof, necessitated 
responses by Class Counsel and an examination and 
analysis by Magistrate Judge Pisano. Finally, even though 
his March 1997 affidavit may not have required the use of 
judicial resources, the subjects of those affidavits, viz., New 
Jersey Deputy Attorney General Suter and New Jersey 
Deputy Insurance Commissioner Kartalopolous, felt 
compelled to respond to the erroneous allegations Malakoff 
made in the affidavit of improper ex parte discussions with 
Judge Wolin. 
 
The sanctions that were imposed were a direct result of 
that vexatious conduct and not an abuse of discretion. The 
only real question with regard to those sanctions is whether 
Malakoff was properly afforded due process before the 
sanctions was imposed. Although we believe Malakoff was 
afforded due process as to the additional costs and fees 
taxed against him under S 1927, we are troubled by the 
absence of particularized notice of sanctions imposed under 
the court's inherent powers. 
 
VI. Due Process Requirements. 
 
"The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
requires a federal court to provide notice and an 
opportunity to be heard before sanctions are imposed on 
a[n] . . . attorney." Martin v. Brown, at 1262. We have held 
that "particularized notice is required to comport with due 
process." Fellheimer, at 1225. "Generally speaking, 
particularized notice will usually require notice of the 
precise sanctioning tool that the court intends to employ." 
Id. An opportunity to be heard is "especially important" 
where a lawyer or firm's "reputation is at stake," because 
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sanctions "act as a symbolic statement about the quality 
and integrity of an attorney's work -- a statement which 
may have a tangible effect upon the attorney's career." Id. 
at 1227. 
 
Here, Malakoff did receive notice in the form of the 
motion for sanctions that Lead Counsel filed on December 
10, 1996. Moreover, on December 10, 1996, plaintiff's 
liaison counsel, co-lead counsel and executive counsel gave 
Malakoff written notice that on December 13, 1996, they 
would cross-move before Judge Wolin for an order 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1927 to impose sanctions. 
However, that notice informed Malakoff that sanctions 
would be sought 
 
       upon the firm of Malakoff, Doyle & Finley, P.C., for 
       unreasonably and vexatiously multiplying the 
       proceedings in this matter, and seeking payment by 
       Malakoff, Doyle & Finley, P.C. of the excess costs, 
       expenses and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred to 
       respond to the application of Kittle and Krell to 
       disqualify the judge in this matter." 
 
The notice only referred to sanctions under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1927, and made no mention of sanctioning Malakoff 
under the court's inherent powers. The supporting 
affidavits of attorney Allyn Z. Lite and Brad N. Friedman 
also referred only to sanctions under 28 U.S.C.S 1927 
without any reference to the court sanctioning Malakoff 
under its inherent powers. 
 
In upholding the Magistrate Judge's determination that 
Malakoff had not been denied due process, Judge Walls 
cited to page 24 of the R and R. See 63 F. Supp 2d at 523. 
There, the Magistrate judge stated: 
 
       In the sanctions matters currently before the Court, all 
       parties were given ample notice of what behavior was 
       in dispute. Each side's motion papers and affidavits set 
       forth in detail why it believes actions taken by the 
       other party's attorneys should result in sanctions. 
       Furthermore, the questions posed at oral argument 
       afforded to the parties an inkling of the Court's 
       concerns about what behavior might be objectionable. 
       Finally, each party was able to listen at oral argument 
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       to the concerns voiced by the other. Surely, each side 
       was on particularized notice of what behavior and 
       actions were at issue. 
 
        Class Counsel and Mr. Malakoff were also given at 
       least four opportunities to be heard. First, both sides 
       presented legal arguments in their numerous and 
       lengthy briefs and memoranda accompanying the 
       various sanctions motions. Second, Mr. Malakoff and 
       Class Counsel both sent to the Court letter memoranda 
       accompanying their submissions regarding the 
       sanctions record. Third, at oral argument, each side 
       was given time for a presentation to the Court, and 
       additional time for rebuttal. Finally, at the end of oral 
       argument, the Court advised the parties that it would 
       entertain one final letter memorandum from each side, 
       so long as each was no longer than five pages. Both 
       took advantage of all four of these opportunities to 
       present arguments to the Court. Certainly, the parties 
       have been given meaningful and numerous 
       opportunities to be heard. 
 
R&R. at 23-24. We agree as to the statutory sanctions. 
 
This record clearly establishes that the sanctions that 
were imposed under S 1927 satisfied due process 
requirements.8 However, as we suggest above, we are 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Malakoff argues that the District Court deprived him of due process by 
refusing discovery regarding record submissions after he filed his recusal 
motions. He argues that those submissions were used to deny the 
recusal motion and to justify the award of sanctions against him. Yet, 
Malakoff chose to demarcate his recusal motion as an"emergency" 
motion. In denying discovery, the court merely treated Malakoff's motion 
like the emergency he himself declared it to be, and afforded it the 
immediate attention Malakoff's assertion of"emergency" demanded. He 
now seeks to use the court's prompt handling of his"emergency" to 
argue that the court denied him due process by not granting a month 
long continuance to take discovery to establish that the emergency he 
had alleged did in fact exist. 
 
Malakoff's claim of denial of due process as to his "emergency" motion 
thus reduces to a claim that without discovery he was denied an 
opportunity to develop a full and complete sanction record. Malakoff's 
Br. at 54. However, he never explains why this is so, and we doubt that 
any explanation is possible given the District Court's finding of bad 
faith. 
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troubled by the propriety of the non-monetary sanctions 
imposed pursuant to the court's inherent powers. 
 
VII. Sanctions Under the Court's Inherent Powers and 
Conditions on Pro Hac Vice Admission. 
 
Malakoff does not challenge the court's authority to 
impose the aforementioned conditions on his applications 
for pro hac vice admission in the District Court of New 
Jersey. He does, however, argue that he was denied notice 
and an opportunity to be heard as to those sanctions. He 
claims that he first became aware that the Magistrate 
Judge was considering requiring him to attach this"scarlet 
letter" (our term, not Malakoff's) to his pro hac vice 
applications only upon reading the July 15, 1999, R and R. 
Class Counsel argues to the contrary and insists that 
Malakoff had ample notice. According to Class Counsel, the 
issue was raised by Class Counsel at oral argument during 
the sanctions hearing and again in their post-argument 
brief. 
 
The Magistrate Judge found that Malakoff was given four 
opportunities to be heard on the sanctions that were being 
considered. See R&R at 24. Judge Walls found that 
Malakoff received particularized notice in the original 
S 1927 sanctions motion filed in December of 1996. He also 
found that "[a] survey of the competing sanctions motions 
filed over the course of the Prudential litigation further 
indicates that Mr. Malakoff was on notice to the particular 
factors that he had to address if he were to avoid 
sanctions." 63 F. Supp.2d at 524 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 
However, the sanction pertaining to pro hac vice 
admissions is substantially more severe than the sanction 
imposed under S 1927 because it more directly impacts 
Malakoff's ability to practice. It is also at least arguably 
more damaging to his reputation and that of his firm.9 
Moreover, although Malakoff was clearly on notice that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. There is, no doubt, more than a grain of truth in Shakespeare's 
familiar pronouncement: "he that filches from me my good name . . . 
makes me poor indeed. . .". Othello; Act 3, Scene3. 
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court was empowered to make him pay for the increase in 
cost resulting from his vexatious conduct and that Lead 
Counsel would request those costs, it is not as clear that 
Malakoff had notice that the court was considering 
requiring him to attach his scarlet letter to his pro hace vice 
admissions in the District of New Jersey. 
 
The Magistrate Judge explained this sanction as follows: 
 
        In addition to the monetary sanction for hisS 1927 
       violations, Mr. Malakoff should be required to answer 
       to the Court for his conduct. One would have hoped for 
       an apology but none was offered. And having read his 
       numerous submissions, having observed his demeanor 
       at oral argument, and having evaluated his concept of 
       professional responsibility, the Court is not satisfied 
       that even a forced apology would have any impact on 
       Mr. Malakoff. 
 
        Therefore, and pursuant to its inherent power, the 
       Court recommends that, prior to Mr. Malakoff's 
       applying for pro hac vice admission in any subsequent 
       litigation in this district, he be required to attach to the 
       motion papers supporting his admission (1) a 
       certification that he has paid the monetary sanction 
       ordered herein, and (2) a copy of this R and R. 
 
R&R at 35. 
 
We do not believe that the notice Malakoff received in 
connection with the motion for sanctions under S 1927 
afforded the kind of "particularized" notice and opportunity 
to defend against this unique sanction that due process 
requires. 
 
In concluding that Malakoff did not have adequate notice 
of this sanction we are particularly mindful of the impact 
that such a sanction would no doubt have on Malakoff's 
ability to practice his trade. Although the sanction is not a 
suspension from practice per se, it certainly raises similar 
concerns, and those concerns ought to inform the 
particularity of notice that must be given to allow Malakoff 
to properly defend against such a sanction. See In re: Tutu 
Wells, 120 F.3d at 381 n.10.("Any suspension from practice 
[and to a lesser degree, severe disciplinary impediments 
 
                                27 
 
 
pertaining to admission to practice], even in a jurisdiction 
in which an attorney does not regularly practice, would 
leave an indelible and deleterious imprint on the attorney's 
career, reputation, and future opportunities."). We do not 
believe that the notice afforded Malakoff was sufficient to 
allow the court to impose the non-monetary sanctions that 
were imposed under the court's inherent power. 




For the reasons set forth above, the order of the District 
Court will be affirmed insofar as it imposes sanctions under 
18 U.S.C. S 1927 requiring Malakoff to pay the increase in 
costs and fees resulting from his conduct. However, the 
order is reversed insofar as it imposes conditions on his pro 
hac vice applications under the court's inherent powers. 
 
In affirming these sanctions we merely conclude that, 
inasmuch as the district court's finding of bad faith was not 
clearly erroneous, we do not think that the monetary 
sanctions were an abuse of discretion. However, nothing 
we say is intended to detract from the important 
role of objectors' counsel that Judge Rosenn so eloquently 
notes in his concurring/dissenting opinion. See  
Concurring/dissenting Op. at 43. Nor do we in any way 
intend to suggest that forceful advocacy ought to invite 
sanctions in the absence of bad faith, and vexatious 
conduct that unduly increases the costs and burdens of 
litigation. 
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ROSENN, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting: 
 
I concur and join in Part VII of the majority's decision 
that the judgment of the District Court be reversed with 
respect to the sanctions imposed under the court's inherent 
power. Because the evidence does not show that Malakoff's 
actions vexatiously and unreasonably prolonged the 
litigation in violation of 28 U.S.C. S 1927 and there is no 
evidence of or findings that he acted in wilful bad faith, the 
sanctions under that statute also should be reversed. I 





Because of the many lawyers involved and their 
adversarial interests, the underlying case was destined to 
sail on stormy waters. Despite some tensions and 
occasional aberrations in civility, but with considerable 
judicial patience and skill, the case had reached a point for 
settlement consideration. Regrettably, as later resulting 
proceedings revealed, because of a lack of precise 
information and a misreading of the sense and scope of 
some of the ex parte conferences, Malakoff filed a motion 
for Judge Wolin's recusal. Until that moment, no motion, 
complaints, or judicial warnings had been even addressed 
to Malakoff. His motion triggered sanction proceedings 
which are now the aftermath of lengthy underlying 
litigation which has long been settled, appealed, and closed. 
 
Malakoff substantively challenges the monetary sanctions 
on the ground that he always acted in this litigation in good 
faith and did not multiply the proceedings unreasonably 
and vexatiously. As a lawyer at the bar for approximately 
thirty years, experienced in class action practice and never 
previously sanctioned,1 he contends that the motions he 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Malakoff claims that he practiced law for thirty years and has a 
substantial professional interest in class action procedures. He asserts 
that he was a member of this Court's 1985 Task Force on Court 
Awarded Attorneys' Fees, and, as a founding member and board member 
of the National Association of Consumer Advocates, he contributed to the 
Standards and Guidelines for Litigating and Settling Class Actions. See 
176 F.R.D. 375 (1987). He also states that he is a frequent contributor 
to and faculty member of the American Law Institute, the National 
Consumer Law Center, and that his legal rating in Martindale-Hubbell is 
AV. 
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filed were reasonably warranted. Even the Magistrate Judge 
(MJ) in assessing the sanction, stated that "[w]hen viewed 
individually, each single instance of misbehavior by Mr. 
Malakoff might not warrant the sanction arrived at by the 
Court. But considered as a whole, his transgressions 
evidence a pattern of obfuscation and mean spiritedness." 
(Maj. Op. at 21). This sweeping statement, however, is not 
supported by a single finding of fact and does not support 
the conclusion that Malakoff multiplied the proceedings 
vexatiously and acted wilfully in bad faith. Obfuscation and 
mean spiritedness, even if true, are indeed not 
commendable, but they do not amount to a violation of 
S 1927. 
 
The District Court correctly stated that the purpose of 
S 1927 is to deter intentional and unnecessary delay and 
that in imposing sanctions, a court must find: "(1) a 
multiplication of the proceedings by an attorney; (2) by 
conduct that can be characterized as unreasonable and 
vexatious; with a (3) resulting increase in the cost of 
proceedings; and (4) bad faith or intentional misconduct." 
In re Prudential, 63 F.Supp.2d 516, 520 (D.N.J. 1999). 
There is no evidence whatsoever that Malakoff filed the 
motion to recuse Judge Wolin for the purpose of 
intentionally or unnecessarily delaying the proceedings. 
Malakoff argued to the MJ that his motion to recuse, which 
prompted Lead Counsel's first motion for sanctions, was 
not filed in bad faith and in fact had a colorable basis. 
Judge Walls concluded that any reasonable attorney would 
have understood that Judge Wolin could permissibly 
engage in ex parte communication in a complex class action 
such as In re Prudential. Id. The Court also rejected 
Malakoff's contention that even if ex parte  communication 
was permissible, he was entitled to notice of the meetings 
and an opportunity to object. The Court reasoned that 
Malakoff had consented to the Court's ex parte  
communication pertaining to settlement long before his 
recusal motion, and the alleged communications between 
counsel and the court involved settlement of the nationwide 
class action in which Malakoff's clients did not wish to be 
involved. Id. 
 
Initially, it should be noted that a review of Malakoff's 
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December 3, 1996, recusal motion reveals that his 
objection was not directed to communication between 
Judge Wolin and Lead Counsel. His concern was that the 
judge met ex parte with Prudential's Chairman, Arthur F. 
Ryan, and that he met with Select Insurance Regulators 
about the proposed settlement without advance notice to 
Kettle/Krell, Malakoff's clients. Malakoff also believed that 
those meetings went beyond the scope of his original 
consent. Malakoff also complained, inter alia , about the 
Court's failure to allow discovery pertaining to the fairness 
of the proposed settlement.2 
 
Malakoff may have misconceived the extent of the District 
Court's authority and its justifiable necessity in meeting 
with officers of Prudential in effectuating this complex 
settlement. Malakoff also may not have shown good 
judgment in his motion to recuse, but mistake of judgment 
is not uncommon among lawyers or even judges. A mistake 
of judgment does not per se constitute wilful bad faith. 
Baker Indus. Inc. v. Cerberus Ltd., 764 F.2d 204, 209 (3d 
Cir. 1985). Judge Walls made no specific finding that 
Malakoff filed the motion in bad faith but only concurred in 
the MJ's "conclusions" rejecting Malakoff's contention that 
the motion was objectively reasonable and filed in good 
faith. In re Prudential, 63 F.Supp.2d at 521. 
Understandably, Judge Walls only referred to the MJ's 
conclusions because the MJ, too, made no fact finding of 
bad faith with respect to Malakoff's recusal motion. 
 
In addition to the foregoing reasons, Malakoff's motion 
for recusal was based on three additional grounds. A fair 
and balanced reading of these grounds, however, renders 
questionable at best any finding of intent to delay, 
vexatiousness, or bad faith. To sanction an attorney for 
questionably egregious conduct unfairly burdens legitimate, 
zealous advocacy, especially in a massive national class 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Malakoff was not the only person to object to the fairness of the 
proposed settlement. The docket entries show that there were many 
others, including the Insurance Commissioner for the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, the Texas Department of Insurance, the Commissioner of 
Insurance for California, and the state of Florida. Malakoff, however, was 
the only one who filed a motion for Judge Wolin to recuse. 
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action, which in itself is sui juris and requires, as in this 
case, innovative and resourceful procedures. 
 
In the Pennsylvania proceedings in Rutt v. Prudential, 
Prudential's attorney informed the state judge that Judge 
Wolin was "receptive to a discussion" with the state judge 
regarding potential ethical improprieties regarding Rutt's 
counsel. Malakoff reasonably may have believed that 
Prudential's suggestion to contact Judge Wolin implicated 
Judge Wolin in an improper plan to aid Prudential in 
delaying state court trials like Rutt until the class action 
settled. Malakoff believed that evidence produced at the 
state court in Rutt and other state cases could "be crucial 
in evaluating the fairness of the proposed settlement" in the 
federal court. Although later developments revealed that 
Malakoff erred on this basis for recusal, such an error is 
not a violation of S 1927. An attorney who reasonably 
believed in the merits of a motion when filed should not be 
sanctioned. To do so subjects every litigating lawyer whose 
motion is denied the risk of sanctions. 
 
Malakoff also based his recusal motion on alleged ex 
parte contacts between Judge Wolin and David Gross, 
Esquire, counsel for a former Prudential employee named 
David Fastenburg who was accused of destroying material 
Prudential documents. During an October 21, 1996, 
hearing, Judge Wolin appeared to refer to a personal 
conversation with Mr. Gross by stating, "I know Mr. 
Fastenburg's lawyer . . . [a]nd Mr. Gross vehemently denies 
on behalf of Mr. Fastenburg that any document was ever 
destroyed by Mr. Fastenburg." The Judge's comments come 
in connection with charges (later proven) that Prudential 
had destroyed material documents. Prudential fired 
Fastenburg for allowing the destruction of documents in 
the office he supervised. In response, Fastenburg sued for 
wrongful termination. In re Prudential, 148 F.3d 283, 343 
(3d Cir. 1998). Although it became clear to some by mid- 
December, 1996, that Judge Wolin had a legitimate basis 
for his October statement3 and that he had not engaged in 
improper ex parte communications with Mr. Gross, 
Malakoff already had filed his recusal motion on December 
3, 1996, well before his belief was challenged. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Mr. Gross's denial was reported in some newspapers. 
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Malakoff believed that Judge Wolin had engaged in 
improper ex parte communications because the legitimate 
sources of information cited by Judge Wolin never 
mentioned a "vehement" denial by Mr. Gross, and Judge 
Wolin never denied speaking privately to Mr. Gross. 4 Hence, 
while five years later it is clear that Malakoff's perception 
concerning Gross was misplaced, it was not unreasonable 
or made in bad faith. Again, there is no evidence that 
Malakoff's interpretation of these proceedings intentionally 
or vexatiously extended or delayed the proceedings. 
 
Lastly, Malakoff claims he based his recusal motion on 
the District Court's comments at the October 16, 1996, 
conference with state insurance regulators. Malakoff cites 
statements made by the Judge that this was "my 
settlement," that all of those present must "hang together" 
so that they could accomplish what they wanted to 
accomplish for their respective interests, and the Judge's 
comment that "although I wasn't in all the negotiations, I 
wasn't just a pretty face." In the underlying appeal of the 
settlement on the merits, the Court reviewed the claims 
that these statements of Judge Wolin demonstrated his 
bias in favor of the settlement. In re Prudential, 148 F.3d at 
340-45. Moreover, the Court of Appeals stated that the 
District Court made it clear at the same conference that it 
had not yet made any decision regarding the proposed 
settlement or the proposed settlement class. 
 
Whether the foregoing incident offered a colorable basis 
for a motion to recuse may be arguable, but there is 
nothing about it that warrants the imposition of sanctions 
under S 1927. Malakoff only needed a single reasonable, 
non-vexatious, non-bad faith basis for his recusal motion. 
Malakoff had several colorable bases for the motion. 
Focusing on the District Court's opinion imposing 
sanctions, there is an absence of specific findings of 
intentional misconduct, of bad faith or of any delay or 
extension of the proceedings. The record reasonably 
supports the conclusion that Malakoff had a colorable basis 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Malakoff alleged improper ex parte communications, and those 
communications, if true, would have been a valid basis for recusal 
regardless of the District Court's further orders against Prudential. 
 
                                33 
 
 
for his recusal motion. Moreover, in this high profile class 
action, Malakoff's motion probably served a very useful 
public purpose in removing any mis-perception of the 
impartiality of the court on the part of any of the policy 
holders, including Malakoff's clients and the many others 
who filed objections to the fairness of the proposed 
settlement. There is no evidence that the recusal motion 
justified sanctions under S 1927 and no findings of wilful 
bad faith to support it. Punishment under this statute is 
"sparingly applied" and requires a detailed finding that the 
proceedings were both `unreasonable and vexatious.' " FDIC 
v. Calhoun, 34 F.3d 1291, 1297 (5th Cir. 1994). In this 
case, there is an absence of detailed findings and an 
absence of a "sparing" application of punishment. 
 
In reviewing the District Court's opinion, it is sometimes 
difficult to distinguish between sanctions imposed under 
S 1927 and those imposed under the inherent power of the 
court. The distinction is crucial, because we hold that the 
disciplinary conduct sanctions under the court's inherent 
powers violated due process. Sanctions under S 1927 are 
compensatory in nature and are intended to compensate 
opposing counsel for vexatious and unreasonable conduct 
that unnecessarily delayed or extended the litigation. Yet, 
in considering "Additional Bases for Sanctions" under 
S 1927, the District Court stated that the MJ"concluded 
that Mr. Malakoff abused the privilege of practicing before 
this Court. His behavior since his arrival on the scene in 
this litigation has been deplorable." In re Prudential, 63 
F.Supp.2d at 521. This sweeping assessment of the 
attorney's conduct, even if it were unchallenged, does not 
support a violation of the statute. This unsupported, 
conclusory statement reflects a mindset of the inherent 
power of the court that colored the District Court's 
judgment with respect to the motion for sanctions under 
S 1927. 
 
The majority points to the rejection of Malakoff's 
argument on the recusal motion on the appeal to this court 
from the fairness hearings. This court rejected the 
argument but it never suggested or stated that the motion 
for recusal was made in bad faith or may have otherwise 
violated S 1927. 
 





Among the subsequent tag-along allegations filed by Lead 
Counsel to bolster their S 1927 cross-motion for sanctions 
was Malakoff's criticism of the fee examiner. This Court 
considered the issues on the appeal of the underlying 
litigation and reiterated Judge Wolin's conclusions that 
Malakoff had "misunderstood the fee examiner's role" and 
had advanced "hypertechnical arguments" in support of his 
motion for disqualification. Judge Walls, in reviewing the 
imposition of sanctions, concluded that Malakoff"may have 
been entitled to object to Mr. Greenberg's ultimate 
conclusion." In fact, the objection resulted in a remand by 
the Court of Appeals for further consideration of attorneys' 
fees. Judge Walls, however, concluded that Malakoff had no 
basis for objecting to the appointment. However, such an 
objection in no way violated S 1927; Judge Walls made no 
finding that it did, and neither did the MJ. There is no 
evidence that the objection unreasonably prolonged the 
litigation or that it was made in bad faith. In light of this 
Court's remand to the District Court for further 
consideration of the attorneys' fees, the objection arguably 
had merit. Whether it did or not is insignificant at this 
point; what is significant is that there is no evidence that 
the objection unreasonably multiplied the litigation in 
violation of S 1927. 
 
Judge Walls then turned to the MJ's observations that 
Malakoff had failed to provide Judge Wolin with courtesy 
copies of his motions before releasing them to the media. 
Malakoff responded that he was advised for the first time in 
Judge Wolin's December 1996 hearing of the judge's desire 
for courtesy copies; up until that point, Malakoff had filed 
pursuant to the local rules and provided copies to the 
media only upon filing. Judge Walls concluded that even if 
the Court were to accept Malakoff's response that he never 
released copies of his motions to the press before their 
filing, he "should have known that the media would contact 
Judge Wolin's chambers upon receipt of any motion papers. 
As an experienced attorney, he should have realized that 
the clerk's office would not deliver courtesy copies to 
chambers immediately." Id. at 521-522. Judge Walls 
asserted that Malakoff's failure to accord Judge Wolin the 
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same respect as the media was unacceptable "and indicates 
that he acted in bad faith." Id. at 522. 
 
The failure, however, to provide copies of the motion 
papers to the Court may have been arguably thoughtless or 
even discourteous, but clearly not a violation ofS 1927. The 
Court did not find that the failure to supply copies of 
Malakoff's motions to Judge Wolin at the time of filing 
multiplied or prolonged the litigation. It could not have 
done so. In no way did this conduct delay the litigation or 
add to the burden of Lead Counsel as to warrant 
compensatory sanctions under S 1927. Neither the District 
Court nor the MJ could or did make such a finding. 
 
The District Court then examined Malakoff's 23rd and 
24th affidavits, both filed within three days of each other 
and subsequent to Malakoff's motion for recusal. Malakoff 
claimed that the affidavits were warranted. He argued that 
the 24th affidavit was intended to supplement and correct 
the legal and factual bases for motions then pending before 
the District Court. The District Court, however, concluded 
that the affidavits merely restated arguments previously 
rejected, and repeated allegations of impropriety on the part 
of the trial judge initially presented in Malakoff's recusal 
motion. Quoting the MJ, Judge Walls found that they 
"evidence[d] no purpose other than to embarrass the 
Court." Id. This is an arguable conclusion. However, there 
is no evidence that they violated S 1927 and the court made 
no findings that they multiplied the proceedings and were 
filed in bad faith.5 
 
As for Malakoff's problems with the discovery process, 
the MJ in his Report and Recommendation pointed to two 
incidents which he concluded caused "colossal time delays 
and monumental obstacles to the orderly settlement of this 
action." These two incidents consisted of: (1) a reluctance to 
review the thousands of documents in the proceedings and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The majority offers no explanation how the affidavits multiplied the 
litigation and why they justify compensatory compensation to Lead 
Counsel as sanctions under S 1927. Class Counsel, including Lead 
Counsel, already were awarded fees in the sum of $45 million by the 
District Court, conditional on another $45 million in the event 330,000 
claims were filed by June 1, 1997. In re Prudential, 148 F.3d at 332. 
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instead requesting a keyword search of precedential 
documents in New York; and (2) a disregard of Judge 
Wolin's order to parties seeking to present evidence at a 
fairness hearing to examine the evidence at the movant's 
offices. The MJ found that Malakoff demanded charts 
summarizing the evidence. Malakoff, in his defense, argues 
that he only requested a "keyword" search when he saw the 
enormous volume of material at the document depository, 
amounting to hundreds of thousands of documents. As for 
the charts, Malakoff argues that he moved to compel their 
production only after Lead Counsel refused his request that 
they fax them at Malakoff's expense. Judge Walls 
concluded that this conduct "unreasonably multiplied the 
straightforward discovery process and delayed the ultimate 
settlement of the case." In re Prudential, 63 F.Supp.2d at 
522. 
 
Judge Walls relies on the MJ's conclusions as to the 
effect of these two incidents. Neither he nor the MJ explain, 
however, how an effort on the part of a lawyer to simplify 
and expedite the discovery process by requesting a 
"keyword" search and a chart of the enormous mountain of 
documents multiplied or prolonged the proceedings. It is 
incomprehensible that a request for a "keyword" search of 
precedential documents intentionally multiplied, delayed, or 
extended the litigation. No explanation is given how it did 
do so. The "keyword" search was denied. Had it been 
granted, it would have expedited discovery rather than 
delayed it or the settlement. Similarly, it is not 
understandable why the request for charts summarizing 
the evidence or for the "keyword" search resulted in 
"colossal time delays and monumental obstacles" in the 
settlement of the litigation. Id. Again, no finding or 
explanation is given. The requests may have been 
presumptuous, but they could not have violated S 1927. By 
no stretch of the imagination could such requests have 
unreasonably "multiplied the straightforward discovery 
process and delayed the ultimate settlement of the case," as 
the Court concluded. Id. In fact, until Lead Counsel 
endeavored to reinforce their motion for sanctions with 
their tag-along filings, no one had ever complained of 
Malakoff's conduct during discovery and no one had ever 
invoked Rule 11 for sanctions. The supplementary motion 
 
                                37 
 
 
is a belated and unreasonable effort to support the motion 
for S 1927 sanctions, and there is no finding that these two 
requests were made in wilful bad faith. 
 
Finally, we review the action of the District Court with 
respect to Malakoff's Rule 11 and S 1927 motions. Judge 
Walls noted in his opinion that the MJ had examined the 
two motions and had concluded that they were identical, 
only refuted Lead Counsel's December 1999 cross-motion, 
did not present an affirmative ground for sanctions, and 
improperly side-stepped Rule 11's twenty-one day safe 
harbor provisions. Id. at 523. The District Court saw no 
merit to Malakoff's objections to these conclusions, 
although it acknowledged that Malakoff was entitled to 
pursue his S 1927 motion. The Court did not, however, 
believe that Malakoff was "entitled to cut-and-paste his 
Rule 11 motion and transform it into a S 1927 motion." Id. 
The District Court ultimately concluded that the two 
motions were identical, baseless, and filed in bad faith. 
 
On appeal, Malakoff contends that he was entitled to 
seek both S 1927 and Rule 11 sanctions for the same 
conduct, and was entitled to pursue the S 1927 sanctions, 
regardless of whether Lead Counsel took advantage of Rule 
11's safe harbor in withdrawing the offending documents. 
He argues that the legal standard for S 1927 sanctions is 
different and far more stringent than for Rule 11 sanctions. 
He asserts that S 1927 sanctions are warranted against a 
party who unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the 
proceedings and that a finding of bad faith is necessary. On 
the other hand, Rule 11 sanctions require a more lenient 
standard of proof, no requirement of bad faith, and aims at 
a party who has made unsupported or frivolous arguments 
in the filings. He reasonably believed that the two motions 
satisfied the requisite standards because they alleged: 
 
       Liaison and Lead Counsel's motion [for sanctions], 
       supporting briefs, affidavits and other papers referred 
       to herein were filed unreasonably and vexatiously in 
       order to multiply the proceedings. Further, these 
       motions and other papers were frivolous. Finally, these 
       papers were filed solely to intimidate Michael P. 
       Malakoff who is objecting to the settlement procedures 
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       used, the settlement, and the request for $90 million in 




Malakoff concedes that the motions are largely identical 
because they are based on the same conduct. This, he 
argues, does not necessarily render them improper. The 
standards and purposes of each differ. He also denies that 
his motions only refute the cross-motion of Lead Counsel. 
On the contrary, he argues his motions explicitly state that 
Lead Counsel's motion for sanctions was filed frivolously in 
bad faith for an improper purpose, and unreasonably and 
vexatiously multiplied the proceedings. 
 
We do not need to decide whether the motions were 
identical, whether they contained affirmative grounds for 
sanctions, or whether the S 1927 motion was for the 
purpose of side-stepping Rule 11's safe harbor provision. 
We must determine whether the District Court erred when 
it "conclud[ed] that these identical motions were baseless 
and filed in bad faith." Id. at 523. The District Court made 
no findings in this respect; it merely announced its 
conclusion. Id. We do not know from this conclusory 
statement whether the motions were baseless in law or in 
fact, and have no explanation of how they violatedS 1927.6 
 
In summarizing the sanctions imposed on Malakoff under 
S 1927, the District Court "adopt[ed] Magistrate Judge 
Pisano's conclusion that `it is clear that, after viewing his 
entire course of conduct over more than three years before 
this Court, Mr. Malakoff takes an impractical, hyper- 
technical, and unreasonable approach to litigation.' " Id. 
The purpose of S 1927, however, is not to alter the style, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Judge Walls held that both motions were only defenses to Lead 
Counsel's S 1927 motion and advanced no coherent legal argument as to 
why they should be sanctioned; that by submitting identical papers on 
the two sanctioned motions Malakoff abused the sanctions process. Id. 
The motions are different in that Rule 11 does not require a finding of 
bad faith. Even though they may have been filed as a defense to Lead 
Counsel's motion for sanctions, it is arguable that this constituted an 
abuse of the sanctions process. Moreover, there is no evidence or finding 
that they prolonged the proceedings and were made in violation of the 
Statute. 
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personality, practicality, or even the judgment of a trial 
lawyer. It empowers the punishment of a lawyer who, in 
wilful bad faith, unreasonably and vexatiously multiplies 
the proceedings. 
 
Significantly, the MJ recommended "that pursuant to 
S 1927, Mr. Malakoff should pay to Class Counsel the sum 
of $100,000 and this amount of money is justifiably 
significant and will require Mr. Malakoff to suffer sacrifices 
in order to pay." In formulating this harsh and draconian 
sanction, it is obvious from reading the MJ's Report and 
Recommendation that he ignored the statute. The statute 
does not empower a court to fine a lawyer for poor 
lawyering or even misconduct. The statute provides for 
sanctions in the form of compensation for provable loss of 
time and additional expenses incurred by the offended 
lawyer as a result of the alleged unreasonable delaying 
action. The record here is devoid of any evidence proving 
"the excess costs, expenses and attorney's fees" reasonably 
incurred because of Malakoff. 
 
The majority acknowledges that Judge Walls did not 
make express findings of bad faith and did not rely upon 
any of "the above-specified conduct in particular, [but] 
based his finding of the requisite bad faith and vexatious 
conduct on the totality of the campaign Malakoff waged 
during the course of this litigation." (Maj. op. at 21). 
Notwithstanding, it adopts the "conclusion" reached by the 
MJ and the District Court. (Maj. op. at 22). However, 
Malakoff and his clients were captives of the order 
consolidating their state cases in the New Jersey federal 
court.7 Malakoff respectfully and professionally satisfied the 
procedures and tools for objection provided by statute and 
the rules of court. Falling back on the "totality of the 
campaign" in lieu of specific findings of wilful bad faith and 
evidence of excess costs and time incurred by Lead Counsel 
is not, in my opinion, an acceptable basis for sanctions 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Prudential's conduct had been under investigation for several years. 
Malakoff filed suit in behalf of his clients in two state courts. Malakoff 
did not appear in the New Jersey District Court until after the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation centralized all the cases before Judge 
Wolin on August 3, 1995. 
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under a penal statute and ignores the "detailed finding" 
required under FDIC v. Calhoun, supra  at 34. 
 
It appears clear that the MJ was influenced by his 
mindset on the inherent power of the court. This is shown 
by his statement just prior to the MJ's determination to 
impose monetary sanctions pertaining to Malakoff's 
behavior. Yet, the MJ acknowledges that "[w]hen viewed 
individually, each single instance of misbehavior by Mr. 
Malakoff might not warrant the sanction arrived at by the 
Court." (Maj. op. at 21) Also significant, Lead Counsel never 
introduced evidence of increased costs and time to support 
their cross-motion for sanctions. Moreover, this court has 
stated that before a court can order the imposition of 
attorneys' fees under S 1927, it must find bad faith on the 
part of the offending attorney that is wilful. Zuk v. Eppi of 
the Med. Coll. of Pa., 103 F.3d 294, 297 (quoting Williams 
v. Giant Eagle Mkt., 883 F.2d, 1184, 1191 (3d Cir. 1989)). 




Finally, I think a reviewing court should carefully note 
the role of an objecting lawyer, especially in as complex and 
massive class action as was this. Malakoff opposed a large 
battery of lawyers intent on reaching a settlement and the 
payment of huge fees. Class actions are unique, each is 
different, and here many state and federal actions were 
consolidated for disposition. An objecting lawyer should not 
be expected to be a quiescent, listless participant in the 
proceedings without expressing contrary view or theories; 
the lawyer should have reasonable leeway for expression 
and argument.8 In another class action, this Court recently 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Malakoff concedes that he was a zealous advocate but denies that he 
acted in bad faith. Amicus Curiae Public Citizen Litigation Group argues 
that objectors like Malakoff play a vital but difficult role in class 
action 
settlements. Public Citizen argues that objectors should be encouraged, 
not chilled, because of the beneficial role they play. Objectors and their 
counsel pursue legitimate and important goals by seeking to block or 
significantly improve class settlements. "Objecting is often the only way 
to protect some class members' interests, even if class members have the 
opportunity to opt out of the class." Amicus Br. at 10-11. 
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noted some of the uncertainties and difficulties that beset 
the court in litigation where most of the parties are not 
personally represented. We stated that there is a 
recognition 
 
       that in the class action context there is no way for"the 
       class" to select, retain, or monitor its lawyers in the 
       way that an individual client would, and because of 
       doubts that a typical lead plaintiff . . . is a terribly good 
       agent for the class. 
 
In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 282 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 
Because of the conflicting interests between Lead 
Counsel and this extremely large class over fees to be 
derived from the settlement, there is a high degree of 
professional responsibility that they owe a largely absent 
class who depend on lawyers they never saw or retained. 
The degree of responsibility is further enhanced in this case 
because the class consists of ordinary policy holders and 
not sophisticated institutions or investors. Therefore, a 
lawyer with objector status plays a highly important role for 
the class and the court because he or she raises challenges 
free from the burden of conflicting baggage that Class 
Counsel carries. The objecting lawyer independently can 
monitor the proposed settlement, costs, and fees for Class 
Counsel and, thus, aid the court in arriving at a fair and 
just settlement for the members of the class who 
individually are largely unrepresented. 
 
When objecting counsel raises pertinent questions 
concerning the conduct of Lead Counsel, the terms of the 
proposed settlement, and the costs and fees to be paid from 
the settlement fund, he or she not only renders a service to 
the class, but also aids the court. The record reasonably 
supports the conclusion that Malakoff's objector status had 
the wholesome effect of providing a careful scrutiny of the 
fairness of a gigantic settlement affecting millions of 
policyholders nationwide. He indisputably enhanced the 
amount of the settlement, and secured a reconsideration of 
class counsel fees. 
 
After all, Class Counsel has very little communication 
with the members of the class and knows little about them 
individually. The members of the class play little or no role 
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in the selection of lead or liaison counsel. Defendants' 
counsel and Class Counsel reach a point where they are 
cooperating in an effort to consummate the settlements. 
Even the court at this point may be inclined to favor 
settlement of a huge, complex action, and the general 
atmosphere becomes largely cooperative. 
 
Under such circumstances, the motions and arguments 
of an objecting lawyer understandably may be discordant 
and disagreeable, but not necessarily unreasonable. The 
objections may be worthy and, at least useful because, as 
the distinguished historian, Allan Nevins, wrote many years 
ago, from the conflict of ideas comes crystallization of 
thought. Objections serve a highly useful vehicle for the 
members of the class and the public generally; they require 
consideration by the court and its disposition of them 
usually provides reassurance that the settlement and the 
fees approved are fair and just. 
 
Thus, I believe that as counsel for objecting plaintiffs, 
Malakoff played a useful and even constructive role in this 
litigation. He may have been overzealous and tenacious, 
but Lead Counsel, as experienced, seasoned class action 
lawyers, are no shrinking violets. They do not complain that 
Malakoff was deceptive or mendacious. On the other hand, 
his services, acknowledged by Lead Counsel, enhanced the 
class settlement by $50 million, and he succeeded in 
having this Court on appeal remand for further 
consideration the $90 million fee provided by the 
settlement. 
 
For the reasons set forth above, I would also reverse the 
imposition of the severe sanctions imposed on Malakoff 
under S 1927. 
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